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INTRODUCTION 
The two traditional building blocks of customary internation-
al law, state practice and opinio juris, are increasingly proving 
inadequate in explaining the process of norm formation1 on the 
international level. The current conceptualization of the primi-
tive or “customary” element of international law has, within 
the past thirty years, become increasingly obsolete as the in-
ternational legal system has begun to resemble its national 
counterparts. The growth of transnational actors2 such as, in-
                                                                                                             
 1. In this article, norms are defined as “a standard of appropriate behav-
ior for actors with a given identity.” See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sik-
kink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 
891 (1998). 
 2. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a transnation-
al actor is the one first offered by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in 
1971. Keohane and Nye define transnational actors as forces engaged in “con-
tacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries.” See Joseph S. Nye 
2016] Reconceptualizing Custom 3 
ternational criminal tribunals, has resulted in a degree of insti-
tutionalized and hierarchical norms that have had no historical 
precedent in the international system. Although these interna-
tional criminal tribunals were designed as self-contained legal 
regimes, their jurisprudence has, nevertheless, begun to be ele-
vated into norms of customary international law.3 Couple this 
phenomenon with the increasing rise and influence of other 
non-state transnational actors within the international system, 
and a complex picture of actors and institutions emerges. This 
article proposes that to understand the new realities of the in-
ternational system, one must turn to socio-legal studies (alter-
natively referred to as legal sociology or law and society), and 
to the new groundbreaking work within that field on norm 
formation, implementation, and interaction. 
Socio-legal studies explore the effect of social forces on the 
law.4 Rather than being interested solely in the internal rules 
and doctrines that form a specific doctrinal body of law, socio-
legal scholars instead look to how law can be, in part, a social 
construction and, in this way, interact with wider historical, 
institutional, and cultural forces within society.5 Socio-legal 
scholarship has identified, with great precision, the emergence 
of global norms and the causal mechanisms that accompany 
their implementation. Most important amongst this scholar-
ship (for the present conversation) is the work of Terence Hal-
liday and Bruce Carruthers. Halliday and Carruthers have ex-
amined how global norms can be exchanged and transferred 
between the transnational governmental, quasi-governmental, 
and nongovernmental institutions within the international 
community as a whole, and domestic states.6 According to Hal-
liday and Carruthers, lawmaking and implementation, on both 
                                                                                                             
& Robert O. Keohane, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD 
POLITICS, at xi (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1972). 
 3. For a detailed description of this phenomenon see Roozbeh (Rudy) B. 
Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and 
New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173 (2010). 
 4. KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 4 (2010). 
 5. Id. at 3–5. 
 6. See Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of 
Law: Global Norm Making and National Law Making in the Globalization of 
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007); Terrence C. Hal-
liday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009) 
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the system (international) and national level, can act as an it-
erative and recursive process.7 
As Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg have noted, interna-
tional law scholarship must move beyond normative debates 
regarding its utility and instead evolve towards more empirical 
work studying “the conditions under which international law is 
formed and has effects.”8 With this guiding principle in mind, 
this article will demonstrate how Halliday and Carruthers’ 
model of lawmaking and implementation as an iterative and 
recursive process (“legal recursivity”) is a more apt description 
of how, in a new international system dominated by norm-
generating transnational actors, international norms both de-
velop and operate. 
Part I of this article will provide a brief overview on the gen-
eral history of customary law and then move towards a more 
specific discussion on the traditionally understood elements of 
customary international law, state practice and opinio juris. 
Part II presents a summary of the recent debates that have 
taken place within the field of international law. Part III will 
examine the current uncertainty rife within the field of inter-
national law over the role of state practice and opinio juris 
within the customary element. It will then briefly survey and 
discuss new theories of customary international law that have 
emerged in order to try and address his uncertainty. Although 
these new theories are both novel and original in their think-
ing, they all ultimately fail to offer either an empirically estab-
lished or convincing picture of how international norms oper-
ate. Part IV will introduce the idea of “conceptual stretching” 
from the social sciences, and demonstrate how a discussion and 
understanding of this idea is key to overcoming the current 
state of confusion within international law over the necessary 
foundations of customary international law. “Conceptual 
stretching” describes the distortions that result when estab-
lished concepts are introduced to new cases without the re-
quired accompanying adaption.9 A comprehension of how “con-
ceptual stretching” occurs, and the tools that can be utilized to 
overcome it, is key in understanding why the current field of 
                                                                                                             
 7. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1135–38. 
 8. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in Interna-
tional Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
 9. See generally Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misinformation in Compara-
tive Politics, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1033 (1970). 
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international law is in such an uncertain state. Part V will 
demonstrate the weakness of the current conceptualization of 
customary international law, one which holds state practice 
and opinio juris as the main foundational elements of interna-
tional custom. Part VI shall present a detailed introduction to 
the idea of “legal recursivity” and demonstrate how, in an era 
of norm generating transnational actors, it presents a more log-
ical and empirically rooted explanation of how norms develop 
in the international system. This article will conclude with its 
own modest suggestions of how future international law schol-
arship can, utilizing an approach that harnesses the theoretical 
rigor of “legal recursivity” and the numerous empirical meth-
ods10 it lends itself to, move the field of international law for-
ward. 
I. CUSTOMARY LAW IN CONTEXT 
Customary law has a long history in human culture and soci-
ety. From the most primitive of societies, to the most advanced, 
customary law has played a role in human development. From 
detailed anthropological studies of tribal cultures, to more nu-
anced historical surveys of republican and later imperial Rome, 
customary law has emerged as both a seemingly universal and 
resilient human impulse.11 Evolving out of this heritage has 
been customary international law, whose conceptualization has 
traditionally firmly been rooted in the sources of its earlier, 
mainly Roman, heritage.12 For example, although the Roman 
law of the early Republic already recognized custom as a source 
of law, many customary norms were later formally codified into 
statute.13 
One of the questions that plagued early Roman jurists was 
how usage could transform into a binding norm.14 The answer 
that emerged in Roman jurisprudence was the idea that what 
transformed an observed practice into a binding obligation was 
a sense of legal obligation by those following the practice.15 
                                                                                                             
 10. In this article, “methodology” is defined as “a concern with the logical 
structure and procedure of scientific enquiry.” See Sartori, supra note 9, at 
1033. 
 11. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 16–26 (2010). 
 12. See id. at 17–26. 
 13. Id. at 17–18. 
 14. Id. at 19. 
 15. Id. 
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This idea was encapsulated by the Latin maxim opinio juris 
sive necessitates (an opinion of law or necessity), which has 
come to be shortened to simply opinio juris.16 It is from this 
early heritage that customary international law is traditionally 
based. Renaissance scholars, most notably Francisco Suárez, 
sought to place the study of the creation and development of 
customary international norms away from the naturalist bent 
of predecessors such as Hugo de Groot, and rather towards a 
more positivist basis rooted in customary law with its associat-
ed elements of usage and opinio juris.17 
Customary international law18 finds its source in the wide-
spread consistent practice of states coupled with the belief (on 
the part of the acting state) that they are acting out of a sense 
of legal obligation or opinio juris.19 When enough of these 
states act in a consistent manner, out of a sense of legal obliga-
tion, for a long enough period of time, a new customary inter-
national norm is said to be created.20 Much then, as was seen 
in the earlier general discussion of customary law, states are in 
effect creating a rule by acting in conformance to said rule over 
a period of time out of a sense of some sort of legal obligation. 
Accepted evidence of state practice and opinio juris has tradi-
tionally been taken to include domestic diplomatic correspond-
ence and statements, domestic governmental reports and 
statements, domestic legislation, and domestic judicial deci-
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. at 20–21. 
 17. See id. at 138–43. 
 18. It should be noted here that international law traditionally comes in 
two main forms, customary international law and the no less important trea-
ty-based conventional international law. As the main topic of this article is 
customary international law, conventional international law will only be 
mentioned in passing. 
 19. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (7th ed. 1997); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. 
 20. Note also that, in relation to conventional international law, multilat-
eral treaties can transform into sources of customary international law, bind-
ing on all states in the international system, whether they are parties to the 
particular treaty or not, if a large enough portion of non-signatory states in 
the international system adhere to their provisions out of a sense of legal 
obligation, i.e. opinio juris. See Baker, supra note 3, at 177. 
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sions.21 Customary international law is said to depend upon the 
consent of nation states—and is thus, at least in the traditional 
understanding presented here, very state-centric.22 As such, a 
nation state that would not wish to be bound by a new rule of 
customary international law could, in theory, vocally object and 
announce to the international community of its fellow states 
that it does not view itself as bound.23 This objection must be 
consistently reiterated, lest it be lost.24 
It is important to note that there are certain rules of custom-
ary international law considered so vital that they cannot be 
contracted out by individual states—such preemptory rules are 
labeled jus cogens norms.25 Opinio juris plays a key role in ele-
vating a regular customary international norms into a jus co-
gens norms,26 for only when the majority of states in the inter-
national system believe that a regular customary international 
norm cannot be persistently objected to, or contracted out of, 
does this regular norm achieve elevation to jus cogens.27 Run-
ning parallel to jus cogens norms are what are called obliga-
tions erga omnes. Obligations erga omnes are obligations con-
                                                                                                             
 21. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 39–40; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (7th ed. 2008). 
 22. For example, if a rule of customary international law is emerging and 
a nation state remains silent, then this can be seen as giving implicit consent 
that the nation state will be bound by the new customary rule. See 
MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 43 (“Even silence on the part of states is rele-
vant because passiveness and inaction with respect to claims of other states 
can produce a binding effect creating legal obligations for the silent state[.]”). 
 23. See generally Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 
116 (Dec. 18); RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 102, cmt. d. 
 24. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 46–48. 
 25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, 71, May 23, 
1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 26. A list of generally recognized jus cogens norms include the right to self-
determination as well as prohibitions against aggression, genocide, slavery, 
racial discrimination, crimes against humanity, and torture. See Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, Fifty-Third Session, art. 26, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001). 
 27. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 22 (1995). Other commentators, however, depart from this 
vision of jus cogens as a clear cut idea. See e.g. Karen Parker & Lyn Beth 
Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (1989) (demonstrating the difficulty in deter-
mining the meaning of jus cogens through a discussion of the variety of defi-
nitions it has been given.). 
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sidered so vital and important within the international system 
(usually in the form of jus cogens norms), that any state 
(whether directly affected or not) may sue another state in or-
der to compel that the obligation be met.28 In this way obliga-
tions erga omnes can be seen as a determinant in questions 
concerning jurisdiction and standing in international law.29 
II. MODERN CUSTOM VERSUS TRADITIONAL CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Although the terms “modern custom” and “traditional cus-
tom” to describe alternative interpretations of customary inter-
national law are recent,30 the debate itself between these two 
viewpoints has existed throughout at least the past forty 
years.31 At its core “modern custom” challenges “traditional 
custom’s” reliance on the state practice prong in the test for 
customary international norms.32 Instead, “modern custom” 
seeks to de-emphasize state practice in exchange for a height-
ened reliance on opinio juris, and in this sense is more deduc-
tive in its logical reasoning where “traditional custom” is more 
inductive.33 The emergence of these two alternative interpreta-
tions of customary international law has generated much de-
bate within the field. 
A. Modern Custom’s Counterpoint to Traditional Custom 
Redrawing the role of state practice and opinio juris in the 
formation of customary international law, adherents of “mod-
ern custom” have posited that, far from being a slow moving 
cautious process, the formation of customary international 
norms can be dynamic, with the a possibility of occurring near-
                                                                                                             
 28. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (New Application) (Belg. 
v. Spain), Judgment, Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 33–34 (Feb. 5). 
 29. YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 59–60 
(2004). 
 30. The term first gained widespread use in the wake of Anthea Elizabeth 
Robert’s influential article in the American Journal of International Law. See 
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
 31. See Baker, supra note 3, at 178–84. 
 32. Roberts, supra note 30, at 758–59. 
 33. Id. 
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ly overnight.34 The key proposition stressed by “modern cus-
tom” is that opinio juris alone formulates the foundational 
source of customary international law.35 State practice is 
viewed as an imprecise idea, with no exact model for the extent 
and regularity of state practice needed for the formation of a 
customary international norm.36 State practice, if it has any 
role at all to play, is more a secondary factor in customary in-
ternational norm formation,37 in that it can be thought of as 
composed of a general acceptance rather than the expressed 
will of individual states.38 Indeed, taking this view further, the 
premise has been forwarded that it is impossible to determine 
whether states in the international system are aware of their 
obligations —for how can the attitudes and beliefs of a state 
which is, after all, a collective political institution, be deter-
mined?39 Under this reasoning, international treaties, long held 
to be a separate source of international law,40 have been held to 
                                                                                                             
 34. Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of State Practice in a Divided World, 
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 531–32 (R. St. J. 
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); Ted Stein, The Approach of a 
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International 
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457 (1985). 
 35. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” 
International Customary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965); Cheng, supra 
note 34, at 532; Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 529, 546 (1993). 
 36. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 156–
62 (1999). 
 37. Indeed, the International Court of Justice seemed to, in part, endorse 
this point of view when, in the Nicaragua case, it relied more heavily on U.N. 
resolutions and international treaties (in order to ascertain customary inter-
national rules on the use of force and principle of non-intervention) than on 
actual state practice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 98–107 (June 27). 
 38. See Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in Inter-
national Law-Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 22, 37–46 (1992). There are, 
however, contrary views to this line of reasoning within adherents of “modern 
custom.” See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International 
Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 1052–56 (1995) (proposing 4/5 quorum of 
states adopting a treaty provision before it could be elevated into a customary 
norm). 
 39. ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
82–85 (1971). 
 40. See supra note 22. 
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potentially generate customary international norms.41 The key 
claim here by adherents of “modern custom” is that as long as 
international treaties are, to a certain extent, widely ratified, 
then the opinio juris that this wide ratification represents is 
enough to seamlessly transform the treaty provisions (binding 
on the signatories) into customary international law (binding 
on all).42 
B. Traditional Custom’s Response 
“Modern custom” has provoked a serious response from ad-
herents of “traditional custom,” who have viewed the de-
emphasis of the coequal natures of state practice and opinio 
juris in customary international norm formation with alarm.43 
At its core, this critique argues that the reinterpretation of cus-
tomary international law advocated by adherents of “modern 
custom” poses a danger to the entire idea of customary interna-
tional law.44 The critique continues that “modern custom,” in 
its emulation of opinio juris over state practice, often reflects 
aspirational goals rather than set standards,45 and as such re-
veals itself to be highly normative in nature.46 
The interpretation of customary international law advocated 
by the adherents of “modern custom” is, according to those who 
oppose it, one that seeks to move the sources of customary in-
                                                                                                             
 41. D’AMATO, supra note 39, at 104, 110, 164; Louis B. Sohn, The Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
347, 352–53 (1981); Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in In-
ternational Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1129 (1982); Louis B. Sohn, “Gen-
erally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1986). 
 42. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, supra note 41, at 
1077–78. 
 43. Although note that some scholars have characterized “traditional cus-
tom” as not viewing state practice and opinio juris as coequal but rather as 
state practice as having precedence over opinio juris which is described as a 
“secondary consideration.” See Roberts, supra note 30, at 758. 
 44. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights 
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 
83 (1989); Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, TEACHING AND PRACTICE 5 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982) (claim-
ing that what adherents of “modern custom” elevate to customary interna-
tional law is “not only not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a 
customary law”). 
 45. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International 
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 110–12 (1995). 
 46. See generally Roberts, supra note 30, at 761–70 
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ternational law (i.e. state practice and opinio juris) away from 
their “practice-based” methodological orientation, and instead 
employ methods which are more normative in nature.47 Adher-
ents of “traditional custom” hold that international treaties or 
resolutions of international bodies such as the United Nations 
should be seen as possible starting points in the development of 
international custom, not norm-generating acts in of them-
selves.48 Adherents of “traditional custom” claim that many of 
the resolutions the U.N. General Assembly votes upon are as-
pirational in nature and are not intended to be embraced fully 
and unconditionally by those states voting for them.49 Given 
this point of fact, according to adherents of “traditional cus-
tom,” the act of using state practice and opinio juris together as 
the yardsticks of custom formation, gains all the more im-
portance, for only then can aspirational or symbolic acts be 
separated from those intended to be lawmaking.50 As such, in 
the absence of state practice, adherents of “traditional custom” 
claim that anything labeled as a customary norm of interna-
tional law lacks legitimacy.51 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The current state of international law is one of deep confu-
sion over the role of state practice and opinio juris within the 
customary element.52 The radically different interpretations of 
                                                                                                             
 47. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
107-108 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1983); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative 
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 425–26 (1983). 
 48. Simma & Alston, supra note 44, at 89–90. 
 49. Thomas M. Franck, Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. 
United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116, 119 (1987). 
 50. See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1505–06 (2003) (criticizing international law 
scholars who, when purporting to make claims about what constitutes cus-
tomary international law, do not refer to state practice). 
 51. See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The 
Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988). Contra Anthony 
D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Arthur A. Weisburd, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 459 (1988) (responding to Weisburd’s line of reason-
ing). 
 52. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of In-
ternational Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004). 
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state practice and opinio juris have led to uncertainty over 
what the precise meanings of these two components of custom-
ary international law actually are. Ultimately the result has 
been a gradual amalgamation of these two formerly distinct 
ideas. New theories have emerged in an attempt to resolve the 
uncertainty, but these new theories have proved inadequate, 
and thus the confusion within the field remains. 
A. Uncertainty Over the Role of State Practice and Opinio Juris 
The role of state practice and its relationship to opinio juris 
in customary international norm formation has been the sub-
ject of much uncertainty in current scholarship. One key point 
of confusion is whether state practice is a separate element in 
customary international norm formation or rather folded into 
opinio juris. The lack of clarity finds its source in the observa-
tion that for the state practice requirement to truly reflect that 
which it purports to reflect (state practice), there must be a dis-
tinction made between those situations where a state has made 
an affirmative claim (which would then count as state practice) 
versus simple government statements (which would not count 
as state practice)—the key stressed here is that affirmative 
claims followed by action are very different things from state-
ments that are not followed up by an act.53 The problem that 
then arises, however, is what to do with the government state-
ments—if they do not count as state practice, then how are 
they to be classified? One problematic answer seems to be that 
they can be thought of as possible evidence of opinio juris,54 
                                                                                                             
 53. See generally D’AMATO, supra note 39; H.W.A. THIRLWAY, 
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CODIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1972 ); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 84 (2d ed. 1993). These views have been challenged 
by other scholars who point out that customary international norms include 
not only affirmative rules but also restrictions on certain conduct—as such 
then what states do not do (omissions), and the reasons they provide for this, 
can be just as important in ascertain state practice as overt acts. Given this, 
what states say can indeed qualify as state practice. See MALANCZUK, supra 
note 19, at 43. 
 54. See generally D’AMATO, supra note 39; Rein Müllerson, The Interplay of 
Objective and Subjective Elements in Customary Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 161–64 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998); Maurice H. Mendel-
son, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS 
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which then has the potential of rendering the entire state prac-
tice/opinio juris divide as meaningless.55 
Though the lack of clarity in what state practice must truly 
reflect has contributed to the gradual amalgamation of the 
former state practice/opinio juris divide, confusion over the ex-
act meaning and parameters of opinio juris has also contribut-
ed to this problem. The confusion here stems from what some 
scholars have labeled as the “opinio juris paradox.”56 The “opin-
io juris paradox” refers to the fact that if the idea refers to the 
belief that a practice has already become a binding obligation, 
then the initial belief in an emerging norm is always a mistak-
en one.57 How one views the implications of this paradox de-
pends on whether opinio juris is seen as a law-creating fact or 
as a law-distinguishing one.58 If opinio juris is a tool to distin-
guish between a mere usage or practice and a binding obliga-
tion, then the issue becomes moot.59 If however, opinio juris is 
something more, then the “opinio juris paradox” becomes high-
ly problematic. As scholars have researched and demonstrated, 
international jurisprudence has issued conflicting and contra-
dictory opinions that have at times supported both view-
points—opinio juris as law creating and law distinguishing.60 
The paradox matters because if opinio juris is a law creating 
fact then it no longer can have a role independent of state prac-
tice.61 
                                                                                                             
155, 206 (1998) (cautioning, however, against treating affirmative govern-
ment action as evidence of both state practice and opinio juris.). 
 55. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine 
Area (Canada v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, 299 (Oct. 12) (holding 
that opinio juris could be confirmed by “the analysis of a sufficiently exten-
sive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas.”). 
 56. See Kammerhofer, supra note 52, at 534–35. 
 57. See Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary 
International Law, 44 INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 501, 502–03 (1995); Kammerho-
fer, supra note 52, at 534–35; BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 149. 
 58. See generally Elias, supra note 57. 
 59. See e.g. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 45 (“Opinio juris is sometimes 
interpreted to mean that states must believe that something is already law 
before it can become law. However, that is probably not true; what matters is 
not what states believe, but what they say. If some states claim that some-
thing is law and other states do not challenge that claim, a new rule will 
come into being, even though all the states concerned may realize that it is a 
departure from pre-existing rules.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Elias, supra note 57, at 506. 
 61. Id. at 508–10. 
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B. Do New Theories of Customary International Law Offer Pos-
sible Solutions? 
The past several years have seen an exponential growth in 
new theories designed to address the current confusion rife 
within customary international law over the meaning and utili-
ty of its sources. Frederic Kirgis has suggested viewing state 
practice and opinio juris as a single idea but along a “sliding 
scale.”62 The “sliding scale” refers to the idea that, in situations 
where there is an excess of state practice, a great deal (if any) 
opinio juris would not be required for the establishment of a 
customary international norm.63 In situations where there is a 
dearth of state practice, opinio juris would suffice for the estab-
lishment of a customary international norm.64 Moving away 
from state practice and opinio juris as points of departure, An-
drew T. Guzman has proposed viewing the compliance with 
customary norms as a key factor in understanding the binding 
character of customary international law.65 Utilizing a rational 
actor model borrowed from economics, Guzman posits that 
states value their international reputation (to the extent that it 
allows them a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis other 
states) and that customary international norms emerge from 
states judgments over whether (a) an international norm ex-
ists, and (b) if their international reputation (and hence future 
negotiating position) will be harmed by a possible failure to 
honor said norm.66 Taking a different approach, Brian D. Le-
pard, taking “modern custom” and its de-emphasis of state 
practice in favor opinio juris as his starting point, has proposed 
viewing customary international norms as having their source 
in a belief in the desirability (on the part of states) of having 
certain international norms (this would suffice as opinio juris); 
which are then subsequently interpreted utilizing universally 
recognized ethical principles.67 
                                                                                                             
 62. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 
146 (1987). 
 63. Id. at 149. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 1840–51. 
 67. BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 8, 77–94 (2010). For a similar call to take ethical 
principles into account in the formation of customary international norms, 
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Though novel and original in their thinking, the new theories 
of customary international law surveyed above all ultimately 
fail to offer either an empirically established or convincing pic-
ture of how international norms operate. Though seemingly 
logical in its description of state practice and opinio juris as 
single ideas along a “sliding scale,” Kirgis’s theory is hampered 
by the fact that it keeps the amalgamation of state practice and 
opinio juris as a single idea intact, thereby openlying rendering 
the “sliding scale” essentially meaningless, for without definite 
distinctions between state practice and opinio juris, the “sliding 
scale” can be gamed to offer whatever answer is normatively 
desired.68 Guzman’s theory has the advantage of largely aban-
doning state practice and opinio juris and instead focusing on a 
rational actor model. Conceiving customary international law 
through a rational actor model, and in the process abandoning 
the twin lenses of state practice and opinio juris, opens the 
door to the use of empirical methods and at the same time side-
steps the problems associated with the collapse of the state 
practice/opinio juris divide. The problem with Guzman’s theo-
ry, however, is that, as he himself readily admits, viewing state 
compliance through a reputational lens limits the range of cas-
es to which the theory applies, for in cases where the stakes are 
high, states will theoretically look to their national interests.69 
In this sense, Guzman’s conception of international law risks 
ceding the entire field to the classical realist position within 
international relations. Lepard’s theory is promising in that, 
similar to Guzman, he largely abandons state practice and 
opinio juris and thereby avoids falling into the conceptual 
swamp that has emerged with their amalgamation as a single 
idea. The key drawback of Lepard’s theory is that Lepard is not 
empirically observing the international system and presenting 
a theory for what empirically is occurring. He is instead mak-
                                                                                                             
see John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global 
Justice, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Ber-
nard Murphy eds., 2007). 
 68. See Simma & Alston, supra note 44, at 96 (making a similar observa-
tion regarding Kirgis’s theory.). 
 69. Guzman, supra note 65, at 1883-1886. 
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ing a normative argument for how customary international 
norms ought to be conceptualized.70 
IV. CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
“Conceptual stretching” is a term that originates from the so-
cial sciences and describes the distortions that result when es-
tablished concepts are introduced to new cases71 without the 
required accompanying adaption. Understanding how “concep-
tual stretching” occurs, and the tools that can be utilized to 
combat it, may offer a possible solution out of the current state 
of confusion within international law. 
A. Conceptual Stretching Defined 
First proposed and developed by social scientist Giovanni 
Sartori, “conceptual stretching” refers to the distortions that 
result when established concepts are introduced to new cases 
without the required accompanying adaption.72 Sartori devel-
oped his ideas in response to the methodological problems that 
had emerged in the social sciences as the range of phenomena 
and institutions it concerned itself to study had expanded.73 As 
social scientists undertook to compare these various phenome-
na, Sartori’s key concern was with what could happen when 
established concepts were introduced to new cases without the 
required adaption, for according to Sartori when this occurs, 
“conceptual stretching” is very often the probable result.74 
“Conceptual stretching” is problematic because it leads to “un-
defined conceptualizations” and “pseudo-equivalence.”75 For 
example, take the example of a “rape” which, depending on 
one’s jurisdiction, has a fairly well established set of attributes 
                                                                                                             
 70. Such a normative track in international law is the very thing that 
Prosper Weil famously argued against. See Weil, supra note 47. 
 71. A note for lawyers—”cases” here are defined as the “units of analysis in 
a given study” and the “political, social, institutional, or individual entities or 
phenomena about which information is collected and inferences are made.” 
See Jason Seawright & David Collier, Glossary, in RETHINKING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 315 (Henry E. Brady & David 
Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 72. See generally Sartori, supra note 9. 
 73. Id. at 1034. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1035. 
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(see Figure 1 below). If the concept of “rape” is stretched to 
mean any form of “sexual assault” then the distinction itself 
becomes meaningless and structured comparison and analysis 
impossible. The problem of “conceptual stretching” does not 
mean that scholarship should shy away from comparing phe-
nomena or run away from generalization, but it does mean that 
scholars must be aware of the problem so that they can then 
look to techniques to combat it. 
To understand how concepts function, one must realize that 
they are composed of two governing characteristics—intension 
and extension.76 Intension refers to the assortment of proper-
ties, which assign meaning to the concept, while extension re-
fers to the range of entities to which the concept can refer.77 
The more general a concept is, the less intension it has and the 
more extension; conversely, the more specific a concept is the 
more intension it has and the less extension.78 Intension and 
extension can be thought of existing along a continuum that 
Sartori labels “the ladder of abstraction.”79 One can either 
climb up the ladder and make a concept more abstract (through 
reducing its intension but broadening its extension), or climb 
down the ladder and make a concept less abstract (through 
broadening its intension but reducing its extension).80 Inten-
sion can only be reduced through “diminishing its attributes or 
properties” that are associated with a concept, and in same 
vein can only be broadened through augmenting the attributes 
or properties associated with a concept.81 Observe the following 
example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 76. Sartori, supra note 9, at 1041. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1040–41. 
 80. Id. at 1041. 
 81. Id. 
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Figure 1: Sartori’s Ladder of Abstraction 
 
More Abstract (low intension, high extension) 
(Example: Sexual Assault) 
  Attributes:  -Unlawful Sexual Activity 
    -With a Person 
 
 
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension) 
(Example: Rape) 
  Attributes:  -Unlawful Sexual Activity 
-With a Person 
-Without Consent 
-Through Force or Threat of Injury 
       
In the example illustrated in Figure 1, the more abstract con-
cept (“sexual assault”) is associated with a smaller set of at-
tributes, while the less abstract concept (“rape”) is associated 
with a larger set of attributes. Intension here was reduced only 
through the reduction of attributes (while in the same way it 
was broadened only through the addition of attributes). The 
problem of “conceptual stretching” emerges out of imprecise 
definitions (and the mislabeling that results) that can then lead 
to “pseudo-classifications” that make any generalization possi-
ble.82 Such imprecision can result from definitions (of concepts) 
that are simply vague and under defined, but also emerge by 
design out of attempts to make a concept more abstract (and 
thus open to more comparisons across cases) without reducing 
the intension. It is along these lines that Sartori counsels that, 
to avoid “conceptual stretching,” when climbing up/down the 
ladder of abstraction, one should always keep in mind the at-
tributes of the conceptualizations under study and dimin-
ish/augment them accordingly. 
B. Customary International Law: A Concept that has Become 
Conceptually Stretched? 
The current conceptualization of customary international 
law, relying as it does on the dual attributes of state practice 
                                                                                                             
 82. Giovanni Sartori, Comparing and Miscomparing, 3 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 243, 248–49 (1991). 
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and opinio juris, is “conceptually stretched.” It is this fact that 
has led to the confusion rampant in the field and opened the 
door to a whole spectrum of contradictory generalizations.83 
The debate between adherents of “modern custom” and those of 
“traditional custom” has led to radically different interpreta-
tions of state practice and opinio juris, which have then worked 
to lead to the gradual amalgamation of these two formerly dis-
tinct ideas. Part of the problem can be attributed to the fact 
that customary international law suffers from a heavily state-
centric bias that fails to take into account the very real effects 
non-state forces, such as norm-generating transnational actors, 
have on the international system. The attempt of “modern cus-
tom” to de-emphasize state practice in favor of opinio juris can 
perhaps be seen then as a way to broaden the array of actors 
that contribute to the development of international norms but, 
shackled to the state-centric biases of international legal theo-
ry, “conceptual stretching” has been the only result. 
A possible solution to the chaos would be to move up Sartori’s 
“ladder of abstraction.” By simplifying things and making the 
object of study how norm formation operates, the discussion 
can be extended beyond simply the nation state and instead 
also include transnational actors. Through looking instead to 
more sociological approaches of how norms develop, new and 
empirically testable frameworks for norm formation from the 
social sciences can be introduced into the discussion. A possible 
outcome of this could be the following: 
 
Figure 2: Customary International Norms up the Ladder of Ab-
straction 
 
More Abstract (low intension, high extension) 
(Concept: General Norm Formation) 
  Attributes: -The Physical Element 
 
 
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension) 
(Concept: Customary International Norm Formation) 
Attributes:  -The Physical Element (state prac-
tice) 
-The Mental Element (opinio juris) 
                                                                                                             
 83. See supra Part III. 
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By moving up Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction” and focusing 
on norm formation in general, distinct advantages emerge over 
simply studying customary international law. The reduction of 
intension allows for the simplification of the attributes associ-
ated with the new concept under study (general norm for-
mation) and thus “conceptual stretching,” at least as related to 
the concept of customary international law, can be avoided. 
Additionally, the broadening of extension allows for the study 
of a much broader group of phenomena. By making the object 
of study how norm formation functions, on either the system 
(international) or national level, the discussion can be extended 
to include a range of hitherto excluded actors. Simple enough, 
but aside from extending the objects of study beyond just state 
actors, what distinguishes the framework above from simply an 
inverse version of “modern custom” (i.e. de-emphasizing one 
prong of the traditional state practice/opinio juris formulation 
in favor of the other)? As will be discussed in Part VI below, 
part of the difference here lies with the study of how exactly 
the physical element gives rise to norms. How do state (and 
now non-state) actors create norms through their binding ac-
tion? More specifically, in an era of norm generating transna-
tional actors, can the effects of such action be modelled empiri-
cally in a sound, logical, and systematic way?   
V. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
The birth of the U.N. gave rise to a new period within the in-
ternational system, which saw the proliferation and growing 
influence of transnational actors.84 Given this new reality, so-
cial scientists and especially international relations scholars 
began to pay more attention to the role of these transnational 
actors85 on the actions and behaviors of states within the inter-
national system. Though the approaches, methodologies, and 
indeed conclusions of this scholarship have varied, one finding 
                                                                                                             
 84. For example, by 2006, there were roughly three hundred international 
organizations and around forty international legal dispute settlement bodies 
in the world, and these numbers, high as they are, mostly exclude nongov-
ernmental advocacy groups. See José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: 
Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324, 325 (2006). 
 85. See discussion supra note 2. 
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has been universal—that transnational actors have a very real 
role to play in both state behavior and the formation of interna-
tional norms. This empirical scholarship can roughly be divided 
into two categories, one which studies transnational actors on 
the system (international) level, and another which opens up 
the study to transnational actors on a national level. 
A. Studies of Transnational Actors on the System Level 
Studies of transnational actors on the system (international) 
level focus on how large-scale international governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations interact with states on the in-
ternational level. The hallmark of this scholarship has been a 
focus on how the presence and influence of transnational actors 
within the international system affects the choices states make 
and the behaviors they exhibit. Looking beyond the domestic 
nation state, this scholarship studies how international institu-
tions exert their own autonomous influence over the interna-
tional system. Indeed, scholars of this school have directed 
their attention to how the emerging international system of in-
terlinked organizations and multilateral treaty regimes is ex-
erting direct influence on the international system without any 
mediation or filtration through domestic states.86 The new 
“units of action” in these interactions are thus no longer domes-
tic states but instead transnational actors who can either link 
together different national interest groups within a related is-
sue and assist them in coordinating their actions,87 or alter-
nately create an environment where domestic state govern-
ments are unable to directly pursue their interests in a given 
                                                                                                             
 86. See TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Robert O. Keo-
hane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1972); RICHARD MANSBACH, YALE FERGUSON & 
DONALD LAMPERT, THE WEB OF WORLD POLITICS: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE 
GLOBAL SYSTEM (1976); HAROLD JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1979); 
JAMES N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: ESSAYS ON THE 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS (1980); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE 
GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTATED NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (Peter Willetts ed., 1982); Baker, supra note 
3. 
 87. See Nye & Keohane, supra note 2, at xviii–xix; MANSBACH, FERGUSON & 
LAMPERT, supra note 86, at 41–45; JACOBSON, supra note 86, at 14–19, 398–
414; ROSENAU, supra note 86, at 1–2. 
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issue area alone and have to instead seek the assistance of the 
same transnational actors and networks.88 
Though varied in the methods employed and approaches tak-
en to the study of transnational actors, the key similarity of all 
of this scholarship has been its focus on how large scale inter-
national governmental and nongovernmental organizations in-
teract with states on the international level. These findings 
speak to the need to include transnational actors in any discus-
sion of how international norms are formed. 
B. Studies of Transnational Actors on the National Level 
Studies of transnational actors on the national level focus on 
how transnational social movements and advocacy groups try 
to push their policy preferences and affect state behavior. The 
hallmark of this scholarship has been its focus on the tools and 
processes these transnational actors utilize in order to attempt 
to affect state behavior and how international norms begin to 
emerge as a result. Early analysis within this scholarship (in 
the years immediately following the Second World War) was 
conducted on such widespread issue areas as the ability of 
states to shape or sabotage the creation of multilateral treaty 
regimes;89 the effect of international organization membership 
on both the foreign policy of its member states90 and on foster-
ing the organic emergence of collective security arrangements 
between various member states;91 and the ability of interna-
tional organizations to target and lobby national legislatures.92 
                                                                                                             
 88. See Nye & Keohane, supra note 2, at xix–xx; JACOBSON, supra note 86, 
at 416-422; Peter Willetts, Introduction to PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL 
SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTATED NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 21-22, 186-187 (Peter W. Willetts ed., 1982). 
 89. See generally Virginia Little, Control of International Air Transport, 3 
INT’L ORG. 274 (1949). 
 90. See generally Benjamin V. Cohen, The Impact of the United Nations on 
United States Foreign Policy, 5 INT’L ORG. 29 (1951); Wytze Gorter, GATT 
After Six Years: An Appraisal, 8 INT’L ORG. 1 (1954); E.B. Matecki, Estab-
lishment of the International Finance Corporation: A Case Study, 10 INT’L 
ORG. 261 (1956). 
 91. See generally Howard C. Johnson & Gerhart Niemeyer, Collective Se-
curity: The Validity of an Ideal, 8 INT’L ORG. 19 (1954). 
 92. See generally A. Glenn Mower, The Official Pressure Group of the 
Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, 18 INT’L ORG. 292 (1964); 
ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
(Robert W. Cox et al. eds., 1973). 
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The findings of this early research pointed to the sometimes 
unique abilities of international organizations to affect behav-
ioral change on the domestic level.93 Later, more contemporary 
analysis within this scholarship has sought to study not only 
specific transnational actors and their ability to affect domestic 
state behavior, but to go beyond and study “networks” of such 
actors bound together by shared goals and values.94 This schol-
arship has presented a fairly unified framework that first em-
phasized how both international forces and national level insti-
tutions could affect the ability of transnational actors to affect 
policy change,95 and then later sought to refine it by evolving 
this static view of transnational behavior towards targeted 
states into a more fluid one (i.e. where the efforts of transna-
tional actors within targeted states are a back and forth affair 
rather than a single one-shot attempt).96 
                                                                                                             
 93. See e.g. Cohen, supra note 90 at 275–80 (Where the author discusses 
how the U.N., through simply existing as a forum for the potential resolution 
of disputes, actually exerted influence on the foreign policy decision-making 
of its member states.); Gorter, supra note 90, at 7–9 (finding that the specific 
institutional structures of international institutions can directly affect their 
ability to influence the actions of their members.); Matecki, supra note 90, at 
266–73 (finding that the support for the creation of the International Finance 
Corporation in the mid-1950s by the United States was a direct result of lob-
bying efforts by members of other international institutions.); Mower, supra 
note 92, at 292–94 (finding that that international organizations can have the 
very clear capacity to specifically lobby national legislatures when the need 
arises.). 
 94. See BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, 
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Thomas Risse-
Kappen ed., 1995); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); 
THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 
(Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999); 
RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sik-
kink eds., 2002). 
 95. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Introduction to BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL 
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES, AND 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995). 
 96. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 94, at 12–16. By building on 
Risse-Kappen’s original 1995 framework, Keck and Sikkink create a model 
that they label as the “boomerang pattern.” Id. This model envisions a world 
where domestic advocacy groups can activate transnational advocacy net-
works who will then, through issue framing and motivating collective action, 
put pressure on other domestic states and relevant international organiza-
tions. Id. See also, e.g., Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization 
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Through utilizing diverse methods and approaches to the 
study of transnational actors, the key similarity of all of this 
scholarship has been its focus on how transnational social 
movements and advocacy groups try to push their policy pref-
erences and affect state behavior, and how international norms 
can then begin to emerge as a result. A key consistency of this 
scholarship has been its exploration of the tools transnational 
actors utilize in order to attempt to affect state behavior, and 
the seeming suggestion that at least some of these processes 
are iterative in nature. These findings speak to the need to in-
clude transnational actors in any discussion of how interna-
tional norms are formed. 
VI. TOWARDS A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK: LEGAL RECURSIVITY AND 
NORM FORMATION 
Given the “conceptually stretched” nature of the current con-
ceptualization of customary international law, a new frame-
work for thinking about international norm formation is need-
ed. This framework, in keeping to climbing up Sartori’s “ladder 
of abstraction” must look to general norm formation as its point 
of departure. As shall be seen, the model of “legal recursivity,” 
points the way forward. 
                                                                                                             
of Human Rights Norms, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn 
Sikkink eds., 1999) Building on both the original framework offered by Risse-
Kappen and Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang pattern,” id. at 4–5, the authors 
create a “spiral model” that envisions a world where, much like that in the 
“boomerang effect,” domestic advocacy groups can activate their transnation-
al advocacy network that will then motivate collective action. Id. at 17–20. 
Where the two models differ is that the “spiral model” views the process as 
much more fluid, with the targeted state making first blanket denials, later 
tactical concessions, and finally rule consistent behavior. Id. The key in the 
back and forth is that each stage can result in the targeted state becoming 
“socialized” by conforming to preferred behaviors and norms. Id. Yet another 
group of scholars envision a world where transnational actors affect change 
in the international system either through taking well established “interna-
tional norms” and using them to “persuade” outlying actors to conform their 
behavior, or attempting to establish new “international norms” where none 
had previously existed in a back and forth process. Sanjeev Khagram, James 
V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink, From Santiago to Chile: Transnational Advoca-
cy Groups Restructuring World Politics, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS 3, 3–4, 11–16 
(Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002). 
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A. Legal Recursivity 
Legal sociologists Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers 
have examined how norms can be exchanged and transferred 
between the transnational governmental, quasi-governmental, 
and nongovernmental institutions within the international 
community as a whole, and domestic states. According to Hal-
liday and Carruthers, lawmaking and implementation, on both 
the system (international) and national level, can act as an it-
erative and recursive process.97 International actors such as 
states, but also transnational quasi and non-governmental in-
stitutions, develop legal norms that are then refracted into do-
mestic states through exogenous processes such as economic 
coercion, persuasion through international institutions, and 
universal norms (that can then act as models to domestic states 
on what constitutes acceptable behavior within the interna-
tional system).98 These norms can then undergo recursive cy-
cles, on both the national and international level, as formal law 
(the law on the books) goes through cycles of change as its in-
terpreted and implemented (the law in practice),99 refracting 
back and forth between the international system and national 
systems.100 That these recursive cycles will occur is not a given, 
nor will these cycles necessarily occur in perpetuity,101 rather 
they are driven by four distinct identifiable mechanisms: (1) 
the indeterminacy of law (the ambiguities inherent in statutes, 
regulations, and court opinions that leads to the possible unin-
tended consequences of their application, setting off repeated 
rounds of redrafting and reapplication)102; (2) contradictions 
(the phenomenon that emerges ideologically when clashing vi-
                                                                                                             
 97. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1135–38. 
 98. Id. at 1146–48. 
 99. “Legal recursivity,” following classic socio-legal theory, holds that the 
“conditions of lawmaking affect implementation, and the circumstances of 
practice influence what law gets placed on the books.” See Halliday, supra 
note 6, at 269. 
 100. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1144, 1146–47. For an earlier 
exploration of this phenomenon in the national setting, see Lauren Edelman, 
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil 
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); see also Lauren Edelman, Legality 
and the Endogeneity of Law, in LEGAL AND COMMUNITY: ON THE 
INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK 187 (Robert A. Kagan, Martin Kry-
gier & Kenneth Winston eds., 2002). 
 101. Halliday, supra note 6, at 274. 
 102. Id. at 281–282; Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1149. 
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sions amongst actors leads to imperfect legal settlements, or 
institutionally when legal implementation is divided out be-
tween different institutions)103; (3) diagnostic struggles (the 
struggle, between various actors, of diagnosing perceived short-
comings in legal norms and identifying corrective prescrip-
tions)104; and (4) actor mismatch (mismatches that occur when 
there is a disparity between actors who actually participate in 
the norm-making process in a particular issue area, and those 
who the norms actually effect—in other words actors whom are 
directly affected by a new norms implementation are not par-
ticipants in its creation)105. “Legal recursivity” conceptualizes 
norm-making as, above all else, an “exercise of power” and a 
“struggle among competing actors in global arenas.”106 Norm-
making has a beginning (time 1) when there are competing 
claims and conflicts and an end (time 2) when behavior and ex-
pectations have become “routinized, orderly, and predictable” 
by accepted and therefore authoritative norms.107 Recursive 
cycles are what occur between time 1 and time 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 103. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1149–50; Halliday, supra note 
6, at 280–81. There is also vast literature in public law on ideological contra-
diction, especially as related to the interactions between the U.S. Congress 
and the Federal Courts. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING 
WELFARE RIGHTS (1994). 
 104. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1150–51; Halliday, supra note 
6, at 278–79. 
 105. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1150–51; Halliday, supra note 
6, at 277–78. 
 106. Halliday, supra note 6, at 268–69. 
 107. Id. at 274. 
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formation, reformation, and refinement of international and 
national level norms, and the causal mechanisms that drive 
this process both within and between the two levels (interna-
tional and national)110. As Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg 
have rightly noted, international law scholarship must beyond 
normative debates regarding its utility and instead move to-
wards more empirical work studying “the conditions under 
which international law is formed and has effects.”111 “Legal 
recursivity” meets this challenge by being open to a whole 
range of qualitative (observational) quasi-experimental112 re-
search designs and methods, including: ethnographic analy-
sis,113 comparative analysis,114 case study analysis,115 and pro-
cess tracing116. 
                                                                                                             
 110. Much of the literature surveyed earlier in Part V, though rich in theo-
retical insight, was somewhat inadequate in detailing the causal mechanisms 
that drove the relationships investigated. 
 111. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1. 
 112. The term “quasi-experimental” was first coined by social scientist Don-
ald Campbell in order to describe research environments where the research-
er in question could not meet the requirements of an experimental research 
design (i.e. specifically isolate the variables under study or randomly manage 
the assignment of causes to units). Though these requirements were fairly 
easy to implement in the hard science world of controlled laboratories, in the 
soft social science world of studying social phenomena in uncontrolled envi-
ronments they became next to impossible. In such situations Campbell cau-
tioned researchers to adopt “quasi-experimental” designs where they would 
strive, to the extent possible, replicate the control (over the variables under 
study) found in experimental designs and, most importantly, also be aware 
that their “quasi-experimental” designs would suffer from suffer from impre-
cise models and partial data. See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. 
STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 
(1966); see also Donald T. Campbell & H. Laurence Ross, The Connecticut 
Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 1 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 33 (1968). 
 113. Ethnographic analysis involves continuous direct observation and pos-
sible interaction of the group(s) under study. See KAREN O’REILLY, 
ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS (2005). 
 114. The comparative method involves the comparison and subsequent 
analysis of a set of cases. Through a systematic set of comparisons made be-
tween sets of cases, the effect of various differences across the cases under 
study can then be gauged. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI & HENRY TEUNE, THE LOGIC 
OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY (1970); David Collier, The Comparative 
Method, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 106 (Ada W. 
Finifter ed., 1993). 
 115. The case study method involves the intense study of single case and 
serves as a useful methodological vehicle for studies looking to test and refine 
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“Legal recursivity” is not only especially well-suited to over-
come the measurement problems inherent to any quasi-
experimental research design,117 but to also provide the “thick” 
descriptive insight that only observational methods can provide 
because it (a) is systematic in its approach through its focus on 
a constantly reoccurring set of dynamics; (b) introduces hy-
potheses related to the actors and mechanisms that can drive 
normmaking;118 (c) identifies beginnings (time 1) and endings 
(time 2) in recursive cycles of norm-making; (d) is historical in 
outlook and takes contingent changes in institutions, based on 
shifts in time, seriously;119 and (e) is comparative and indeed 
                                                                                                             
theories. The detailed descriptive analysis it demands can serve to provide for 
the observation of potential causal interactions between identified variables. 
See generally Arent Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative 
Method, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 682 (1971); John Gerring, What is a Case 
Study and What is it Good For?, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 341 (2004). 
 116. Process tracing is a method designed, in part, to identify the “causal 
process” or “causal chain” between independent and dependent variables. 
This is achieved through the systematic mapping of the “explanatory narra-
tive” until the position where the relationships between the various variables 
can be identified. This can be undertaken through a detailed narrative, gen-
eralization, or an analytic explanation. See ANDREW BENNETT & ALEXANDER 
GEORGE, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
(2005). 
 117. See, e.g., discussion supra note 112. 
 118. In this way “legal recursivity” corrects a key flaw in international law 
“theory,” the lack of any clear or accepted overarching theoretical framework. 
See Kammerhofer, supra note 52, at 536–51. 
 119. By taking time and historical processes seriously, “legal recursivity” is 
compatible with historical institutionalist approaches. Historical institution-
alism is “neither a particular theory nor a specific method,” instead it is a 
process or “approach to studying politics and social change” (with the associ-
ated method most often used to study this change being the case study). This 
process is different from others because in looking to answer empirical ques-
tions, it focuses on both the historical orientation and trajectory of institu-
tions, and how they can change and shape behavior. Institutions then are not 
classic independent or explanatory variables, but rather act as mediators or 
filters shaping the effects of other independent variables (whatever they may 
be). History itself becomes a methodological tool of analysis, with institutions 
become the main units of said analysis. See, e.g., STRUCTURING  POLITICS: 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Sven Steinmo, Kath-
leen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); Evan S. Lieberman, Causal In-
ference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization 
Strategies, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1011 (2001); Sven Steinmo, Historical Insti-
tutionalism, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A 
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encourages comparisons across issue areas and levels of analy-
sis.120 
 
Figure 4: Legal Recursivity and the Mechanisms that Drive It 
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PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE 118 (Donatella della Porta & Michael Keating eds., 
2008). 
 120. Halliday, supra note 6, at 269. 
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C. Legal Recursivity and International Norm Formation: A 
Comparative Case Study (Crimes Against Humanity) 
The emergence of “crimes against humanity” as a specific in-
ternational offense has been fairly recent, starting only in the 
beginning of the twentieth century and developing in earnest 
in the years immediately following the end of the Second World 
War. An analysis of the origins and development of crimes 
against humanity that takes legal recursivity as its starting 
point, thereby abandoning the traditional approach that has 
looked to how this offense emerged from its treaty based ori-
gins and developed as a customary international norm, has 
many advantages. The most important of these advantages is 
that such a point of departure makes sense of how the initial 
burst of activity around the doctrinal development of the of-
fense in the immediate years following the end of the Second 
World War soon came to an end, ushering in a nearly forty-year 
freeze. A freeze that only expired in the early 1990s, with the 
establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) by the 
U.N. Security Council, and the later related emergence (by 
treaty) of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). It 
would be these, more recent, developments that would contrib-
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ute to crimes against humanity’s status as a doctrine of inter-
national criminal law under constant recursive cycles of re-
finement and interpretation—a process that is currently still 
ongoing. 
1. Overview 
The origin of “crimes against humanity” as a specific interna-
tional crime can be first traced to the Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1899 and 1907. Both of these international conferences had 
been proposed by the great powers of the day to negotiate the 
conduct of nations in war. Both conferences resulted in a set of 
international treaties/conventions (the Hague Conventions)121 
that served as one of the first international attempts to codify 
what behavior was acceptable/unacceptable by nations during 
warfare.122 In 1919, with the conclusion of the First World War, 
the victorious Allied Powers established the Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties (the “Commission”) to explore the actions of the de-
feated Central Powers during the conflict. The Commission 
recommended that a tribunal be established to judge all mem-
bers of the defeated Central Powers found to have violated the 
“laws of humanity.”123 “Laws of humanity” were defined broad-
ly by the Allied Powers as offenses that the Central Powers had 
committed against their own citizens.124 Ultimately, the Com-
mission’s recommendation to establish a tribunal was rejected, 
with the main country leading the charge being the United 
States, which argued that the standards for judging violations 
of the “laws of humanity” were uncertain and unclear.125 
                                                                                                             
 121. The Hague Conference of 1899 resulted in three international treaties, 
while the Conference of 1907 resulted in thirteen. 
 122. See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
Warfare on Land, pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277. 
 123. Comm’n on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on En-
forcement of Penalties, Rep. Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 
Mar. 29, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (1920). 
 124. Id. at 121–23. 
 125. Am. Comm’s to Negotiate Peace, Memorandum of Reservations pre-
sented by the Reps. of the United States to the Rep. of the Comm’n on Respon-
sibilities, Apr. 4, 1919, reprinted in General Records of the Am. Comm’n to 
Negotiate Peace 1918–1931, PPC Doc. F.W.181.12302/7. 
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Although the United States had been opposed to establishing 
a tribunal to judge violations of the “laws of humanity” in the 
wake of the First World War, its attitude would change radical-
ly at the close of the Second World War in 1945.126 It was at 
this point that the United States became one of the key advo-
cates for the establishment of an international tribunal to try 
members of the defeated Nazi regime for, amongst other 
things, offenses against its own citizens.127 The tribunal that 
was initially established, the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) set in Nuremberg to try leading Nazi officials, did much 
to contribute to the development of crimes against humanity as 
a specific international offense. Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter 
defined crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts . . . or per-
secutions on political, racial or religious grounds” committed 
against a civilian population in the context of an armed con-
flict.128 The importance of Article 6(c) lay in the fact that it 
“was the first international instrument to define crimes against 
humanity as a positive crime punishable under international 
law.”129 As such, the IMT Charter set the trajectory of the doc-
trinal development of crimes against humanity as a specific in-
ternational offense. The importance of the IMT Charter would 
remain in the decades following the Second World War as Arti-
cle 6(c); in the absence of any other major international treaty 
or convention defining the parameters of crimes against hu-
manity, would remain one of the main defining guides to this 
developing international criminal offense. 
Building on the aftermath of the IMT Charter and the trial of 
leading Nazi leaders, in 1947 the U.N. established the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) partly in order to bring together 
and codify international law—including the then developing 
offense of crimes against humanity.130 In Article 2(11) of the 
first Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
                                                                                                             
 126. GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L. BISCHOFF & NATALIE L. REID, ELEMENTS OF 
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–23 (2008) 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Charter of the Int’l Military Tribunal, art 6(c). 
 129. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 20. See also William J. Fen-
rick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 772–75 (1999). 
 130. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), Establishment of an International Law Com-
mission (Nov. 21, 1947). 
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Mankind that the ILC published in 1954, the language of Arti-
cle 6(c) of the IMT Charter defining crimes against humanity 
as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and oth-
er inhumane acts . . . or persecutions on political, racial or reli-
gious grounds” was kept,131 but the armed conflict requirement 
was modified and replaced with a requirement that crimes be 
committed under the “instigation or toleration” of state author-
ities.132 After 1954, the doctrinal development of crimes against 
humanity on the international level slowed down to a virtual 
standstill,133 with much of this paralysis attributable to the fact 
that the ILC took nearly forty years to debate and come up 
with a final Draft Code in 1996.134 Indeed, the 1996 Draft Code 
itself relied heavily on another set of international develop-
ments that had occurred several years earlier in 1993 and 
1994, the establishment of the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR.135 
The nearly forty-year freeze in the doctrinal development of 
crimes against humanity came to an end in the early 1990s 
with the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR by the U.N. Se-
curity Council, in order to judge serious breaches of interna-
tional law committed in the conflicts taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia136 and Rwanda,137 and the related promulgation of a 
final ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security 
                                                                                                             
 131. The text of the 1954 ILC Draft Code specifically read “The following 
acts are offenses against the peace and security of mankind: . . . Inhuman 
acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecu-
tions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial, 
religious or cultural grounds . . . .” See Draft Code of Offenses Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N art. 2(11) (1954). 
[hereinafter Draft Code of Offenses] 
 132. Id. Some scholars have been highly critical of the 1954 ILC Draft Code 
as neither fully following the IMT Charter in its modification of the armed 
conflict requirement nor fully breaking with it either. 
 133. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 28–29. Though note that 
during this period there were a number of national level trials for crimes 
against humanity. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 29–30 (“[T]he 1996 Draft Code’s definition of crimes against 
humanity resembles that of the ad hoc Tribunals as developed in their juris-
prudence—most notably in that the punishable conduct must be committed, 
as the ILC draft puts it, ‘in a systematic manner or on a large scale.’”). 
 136. See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993). 
 137. See S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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of Mankind in 1996.138 While the ICTY and ICTR were not 
tasked with “making” international criminal law,139 but rather 
only with applying it, it was inevitable that their establishment 
would have a deep effect on the development of certain interna-
tional offenses, especially those such as crimes against human-
ity that were not very well defined at the time.140 
The ICTY Statute, which came out in 1993, followed in the 
footsteps of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, requiring that any 
listed crimes against humanity be committed in the context of 
an armed conflict.141 This armed conflict requirement, whilst 
keeping with Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, went against the 
post-IMT Charter trials of lesser Nazi officials that had been 
conducted by the Allied Powers outside of the IMT Charter re-
gime under Control Council Law No. 10 (where no armed con-
flict requirement had been present),142 and against the 1954 
                                                                                                             
 138. See Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N pt. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code of Offenses 
(1996)]. 
 139. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 
(May 3, 1993). With respect to states the following in regards to the estab-
lishment of the ICTY, the U.S. Secretary General stated “the Security Coun-
cil would not be creating or purporting to ‘legislate’ the law. Rather, the In-
ternational Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international . 
. . law.” Id. 
 140. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 26–31; Baker, supra 
note 3, at 185. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Development of 
International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, in 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 97 (Jochen 
A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 1998); William Schabas, Customary Law 
or “Judge-Made” Law: Judicial Creativity at the UN Criminal Tribunals, in 
THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO 77 (José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser 
& M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 2009). 
 141. S.C. Res. 827, art. 5 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Statute for the Int’l 
Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia]. 
 142. The trial of lesser Nazi officials (i.e., outside of the main civilian and 
military leadership) was conducted by the Allied Powers outside of the IMT 
Charter regime under Control Council Law No. 10 (which provided for trials 
by military tribunal of the individual Allied Powers). It should be noted, how-
ever, that although Control Council Law No. 10 did not contain the require-
ment that crimes against humanity be committed in the context of an armed 
conflict, the majority of jurisprudence of the trials held under Control Council 
Law No. 10 still required the link. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 
126, at 24–26. 
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ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind which, as mentioned earlier, had replaced the armed 
conflict requirement of the IMT Charter with a requirement 
that crimes need only be committed under the “instigation or 
toleration” of state authorities.143 The ICTR Statute, which 
came out one year after its ICTY counterpart, took the ap-
proach of Control Council Law No. 10 and the 1954 ILC Draft 
Code, by not requiring that the listed crimes against humanity 
be committed in the context of an armed conflict—the ICTR 
Statute instead required that the listed crime against humani-
ty need only be committed “on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds.”144 The 1996 ILC Draft Code also mirrored 
the ICTR approach by not containing an armed conflict re-
quirement, but only required that listed crimes against human-
ity be committed under the instigation of state authorities145—
there was no requirement for such crimes to be committed “on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” as there 
had been in the ICTR Statute. 
Though they differed on whether an armed conflict was nec-
essary element for the commission of a crime against humani-
ty, both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes took identical approaches 
in defining crimes against humanity as consisting of the follow-
ing acts (first enumerated in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter 
and Article 2(11) of the 1954 ILC Draft Code): murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.146 To 
this existing list, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes also then added 
                                                                                                             
 143. Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 131, art. 2(11). 
 144. S.C. Res. 955, art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Statute for the Int’l 
Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda]. The ICTR Statute also required that a listed 
crime against humanity be committed “as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack.” Although the ICTY Statute originally did not contain this additional 
provision, it was later incorporated into the Statute through case law. See 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 85 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 
12, 2002). 
 145. Draft Code of Offenses (1996), supra note 138, art. 18. 
 146. Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra 
note 141, art. 5; Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 
144, art. 3. 
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the additional acts of: imprisonment, torture, and rape.147 The 
1996 ILC Draft Code closely followed this approach but ex-
panded the definitions of rape and other inhumane acts, and 
then added the additional acts of institutionalized discrimina-
tion and the forced disappearance of persons.148 Contributions 
from their Statutes aside, ICTY and ICTR also contributed to 
the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity through 
their extensive jurisprudence.149 This jurisprudence established 
the general requirements for a listed act to qualify as a crime 
against humanity,150 and provided detailed guidance of the re-
quired mental (mens rea) and physical (actus reus) elements151 
each act requires.152 The experiences and lessons learned from 
                                                                                                             
 147. Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra 
note 141, art. 5; Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda supra note 
144, art. 3. 
 148. Draft Code of Offenses (1996), supra note 138, art. 18. 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 139, 140. 
 150. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 144, at ¶ 85 (Where the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber listed the following elements that had to be present 
for a listed act under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to qualify as a crime 
against humanity: an attack, perpetrator(s) must be part of the attack, attack 
must be directed against a civilian population, attack must be widespread or 
systematic, and perpetrator(s) must be aware that there is a pattern of wide-
spread or systematic attacks against the particular civilian population and 
intend for their attack to fit into this pattern.). 
 151. Under both “civil,” or inquisitorial, legal systems and “common,” or 
accusatorial ones, all crimes, at their base, require two elements: (1) the men-
tal guilty mind, or mens rea, and (2) the physical guilty act, or actus reus. 
See, e.g., JEAN PRADEL, MANUEL DE DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 436–38. (9th ed. 
1994); ZORAN STOJANOVIĆ, KRIVIČNO PRAVO, OPŠTI DEO 111–17, 162–64 (1st ed. 
2000); RICHARD CARD, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 (15th ed. 2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 5.1, 6.1 (3d ed. 2010). 
 152. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. [Čelebići], Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing some of the elements required for the act of mur-
der to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case 
No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 227–29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002) (elements required for the act of extermi-
nation to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case 
No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 350 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 25, 2002) (elements required for the act of enslave-
ment to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. 
IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 278 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006) (elements required for the act of deporta-
tion to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, 
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 302–03 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
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the work of the ICTY and ICTR would directly affect how 
crimes against humanity would be defined in the Rome Statute 
of the ICC in 1998, which contains, to date, the most recent in-
ternational iteration on crimes against humanity as an inter-
national offense.153 The Rome Statute’s approach to defining 
crimes against humanity would differ in several key points 
from the ICTY and ICTR approaches. Indeed, an analysis of 
the debates and disputes during the drafting of Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute (governing crimes against humanity) reveals a 
complex picture. 
Whether to include an armed conflict requirement (as con-
tained in the ICTY Statute, but absent from the ICTR Statute 
and 1996 ILC Draft Code) for crimes against humanity in Arti-
cle 7, was a key debating point amongst the delegates to the 
Rome Conference.154 Ultimately, the requirement was dropped 
from Article 7 (placing it more in line with the treatment of 
crimes against humanity in the ICTR Statute and 1996 ILC 
Draft Code). The prevailing side was of the opinion that cus-
tomary international law155 no longer required that crimes 
against humanity be committed in the context of an armed con-
flict, and that the inclusion of such a requirement could create 
“an unnecessary burden for prosecutions.”156 Though the view 
that crimes against humanity no longer required a nexus to an 
armed conflict prevailed at the Rome Conference, there was a 
significant minority on the losing end of the argument (mainly 
                                                                                                             
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (elements required for the act of 
imprisonment to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kuna-
rac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 495 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (elements required 
for the act of torture to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (elements required for the act 
of persecution to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kordić 
& Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) (elements required for 
other inhumane acts to qualify as a crime against humanity.). 
 153. In 1998, an international treaty was adopted establishing a permanent 
ICC to judge serious breaches of international criminal law. See Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 154. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 105–06. 
 155. See supra Part I for a discussion and explanation of the traditionally 
held sources of customary international law: state practice and opinio juris. 
 156. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 105–06. 
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amongst the African, Arab, and Asian delegations) that felt 
customary international law still required the nexus,157 and 
this view, although a minority one, is certainly not without its 
adherents.158 
Another point of debate over Article 7 of the Rome Statute 
involved the acts that would be defined as crimes against hu-
manity. Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes had contained iden-
tical exhaustive lists which the Rome Statute replicates, but 
with two key differences. The first difference centers on the act 
of persecution, which the ICTY and ICTR Statutes stated could 
be committed on “political, racial, or religious grounds.”159 Arti-
cle 7 of the Rome Statute keeps this wording but then adds 
that persecution can also be committed on national, ethnic, cul-
tural, or gender grounds or any “other grounds that are univer-
sally recognized as impermissible under international law.”160 
This broader definition had been the subject of an intense de-
bate between various state delegations—with some of the dele-
gations arguing for an expansive list defining the grounds un-
der which persecution could qualify as a crime against humani-
ty, others arguing for more illustrative list.161 Yet others still 
arguing that persecution be removed as an act that could quali-
fy as a crime against humanity altogether.162 Ultimately, those 
                                                                                                             
 157. See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdic-
tion of the Court, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS 
AND RESULTS 94 n. 43 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). See also Stuart Ford, Crimes 
Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: 
Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 
129–32 (2007) (describing the debates that occurred, in the years following 
the end of World War II, over whether crimes against humanity in customary 
international law still required the armed conflict nexus.). 
 158. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 187–88 
(2006) (discussing how the probable explanation for the ICTY Statute’s inclu-
sion of the armed conflict requirement for crimes against humanity in 1993 
was the U.N. Secretary General’s view that to not have done so would have 
violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (the prohibition on the crea-
tion of any ex post facto law to the disadvantage of the accused)). 
 159. Statute for the Int’l Criminal Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, supra note 141, art. 5(h); Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, 
supra note 144, art. 3(h). 
 160. Rome Statute, supra note 153, art. 7(1)(h). 
 161. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 101. 
 162. See Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Vol. I, ¶ 99 U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996). 
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arguing for a more expansive list won out, though this ap-
proach has not been without criticism.163 The second difference 
between the ICTY/ICTR Statutes and the Rome Statute relates 
to the two new additional acts that the Rome Statute added to 
the list already established by the ICTY and ICTR—these two 
new acts being enforced disappearance and apartheid.164 The 
inclusion of enforced disappearance and apartheid as acts that 
could qualify as crimes against humanity was mainly at the 
insistence of the Latin American and African delegations re-
spectively,165 and was later criticized by some scholars as being 
well outside the understood parameters of crimes against hu-
manity under customary international law.166 
As it currently stands, Article 7 of the Rome Statute is the 
most recent international iteration on crimes against humanity 
as an international offense. In surveying the doctrinal devel-
opment of crimes against humanity in the years following the 
close of the Second World War, a complex picture has emerged 
of a doctrine of international criminal law under constant re-
finement and interpretation. 
                                                                                                             
 163. See Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 376–77 
(Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (Where the 
author criticizes the expansive definition of persecution in Article 7(h) of the 
Rome Statute as well beyond the standard under customary international 
law.). 
 164. See Rome Statute, supra note 160, arts. 7(1)(i), 7(1)(j). Technically 
speaking, there were actually more than two new additional acts (that could 
be qualified as crimes against humanity) included in the Rome Statute vis-à-
vis the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, but these other acts (sexual offenses other 
than rape and forcible transfer) had already been incorporated into the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes through case law. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 
126, at 108–09. 
 165. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 102 n.75. That the Latin 
American delegations would insist on the inclusion of enforced disappearance 
(given the prevalence of such crimes during by the governing right-wing mili-
tary junta’s in that region during the 1960s through to 1980s ) and the Afri-
can delegations on apartheid (given the history of apartheid in South Africa 
and Rhodesia by minority white governments) is perhaps understandable. 
 166. See Cassese, supra note 163, at 376; BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra 
note 126, at 109. Interestingly other additional acts (that could qualify as 
crimes against humanity) were also proposed (but ultimately rejected) during 
the drafting of Article 7—these acts were: terrorism (proposed by the Indian, 
Sri Lankan, and Turkish delegations), mass starvation (proposed by the Cos-
ta Rican delegation), and imposition of economic embargo (proposed by the 
Cuban delegation). See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 102–03. 
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Figure 5: The Development of Crimes Against Humanity as 
an International Offense 
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2. Crimes Against Humanity and Recursive Cycles 
As previously illustrated, the Rome Statute’s approach to de-
fining crimes against humanity would differ in several key 
points from the ICTY and ICTR approaches. It is in exploring 
2016] Reconceptualizing Custom 43 
these differences in detail that a complete picture emerges of 
whether crimes against humanity, as a specific category of in-
ternational criminal offense, is currently subject to the pres-
ence of recursive cycles (indicating competing claims and con-
flicts as to its meaning and application), or if recursive cycles 
are not present (indicating acceptance and authority as to 
meaning and application). In observing the development of 
crimes against humanity as a specific international offense, es-
pecially the debates that surrounded its definition and elabora-
tion in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, a picture emerges which 
indicates the presence of recursive cycles. 
Crimes against humanity, as a category of international of-
fense, is today very much the subject of competing claims and 
conflicts as to its meaning and application—a fact very much 
highlighted by the debates over its scope and application both 
during the drafting of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, and even 
before during the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR in the 
early 1990s. As previously discussed, the doctrinal develop-
ment of crimes against humanity as an international criminal 
offense only began in earnest at the close of the Second World 
War with the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. 
With the publication of the 1954 ILC Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the doctrinal de-
velopment of crimes against humanity came to a virtual stand-
still for the next forty years, as the ILC became mired in de-
bates over defining the scope and application of the offense. 
Part of the problem during this time originated in the fact that 
the ILC was working in a vacuum of sorts, as there were no in-
ternational conventions or jurisprudence on the subject during 
this period. This vacuum would set the stage for the first 
mechanism driving recursive cycles of norm-making in relation 
to the development of crimes against humanity as an interna-
tional offense—the “indeterminacy of law.” 
The “indeterminacy of law” refers to the ambiguities that can 
be inherent in legal instruments (e.g. treaties, statutes, regula-
tions, court opinions, etc.) that can then lead to possible unin-
tended consequences in their application—thereby setting off 
repeated rounds of redrafting and reapplication.167 The inabil-
ity of the ILC to resolve the conflict between the IMT Charter’s 
insistence on an armed conflict requirement for crimes against 
                                                                                                             
 167. See supra Part VI. 
44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2 
humanity, and Control Council Law No. 10’s insistence on not 
having such a requirement, combined with international si-
lence on the subject (in the form of the absence of any interna-
tional conventions or jurisprudence regarding the issue during 
this period), created an environment where ambiguity pre-
vailed. When in 1993 the ICTY Statute insisted on an armed 
conflict requirement, in direct opposition to both the ICTR 
Statute that came out a year later, and the final ILC Draft 
Code that came out in 1996, the stage was set for redrafting 
and reapplication between the various actors. The majority of 
this activity took place in the jurisprudence of the ICTY which, 
through its case law, began to systematically dilute the armed 
conflict requirement in its Statute by declaring that customary 
international law no longer required the armed conflict nexus 
for the commission of a crime against humanity (and that the 
requirement in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute was for jurisdic-
tional purposes only),168 and that the requirement did not de-
mand a material link between the crime against humanity al-
legedly committed and the armed conflict in question.169 In this 
way, the ICTY, through its jurisprudence, began to bring its 
definition of crimes against humanity more in line with those 
of the ICTR and 1996 ILC Draft Code. The legal ambiguity that 
had existed in the forty years between the end of the Second 
World War and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals man-
ifested itself, then, in driving recursive cycles of norm-making 
between these various international actors. The Rome Statute’s 
                                                                                                             
 168. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Since customary international law no long-
er requires any nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict . . 
. , Article 5 was intended to reintroduce this nexus for the purposes of this 
Tribunal.”). 
 169. See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on the 
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 13–14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2004) (“As expressed in the jurisprudence of 
the Tribunal, the jurisdictional requirement of Article 5 requires the 
existence of an armed conflict at the time and place relevant to the 
indictment, but it does not mandate any material nexus between the acts of 
the accused and the armed conflict . . . All that is required under Article 5 of 
the Statute is that the prosecution establish that an armed conflict is 
sufficiently related to the Article 5 crime with which the accused is charged . . 
. there is no need for the Prosecution to establish a material nexus between 
the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.”). 
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exclusion of the armed conflict requirement in its definition of 
crimes against humanity in 1998 did not bring these cycles to 
an end. Indeed, if anything, the recursivity has intensified—
witness the recent jurisprudence of the East Timor Special 
Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC)170, which although its Stat-
ute defines crimes against humanity per the Rome Statute def-
inition (i.e. minus an armed conflict requirement),171 has ruled 
in its case law that crimes against humanity require an armed 
conflict nexus.172 
Recall that although the ad hoc Tribunals were purportedly 
designed to apply existing international law,173 their jurispru-
dence inevitably had a deep effect on the development of cer-
tain international offenses, especially those such as crimes 
against humanity, that were not very well defined at the time. 
The experiences and lessons learned from the work of the ICTY 
and ICTR would directly affect how crimes against humanity 
would be defined in the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, but it 
would also set the stage for the second (and final) mechanism 
driving recursive cycles of norm-making in relation to the de-
velopment of crimes against humanity as an international of-
fense—”contradictions.” 
“Contradictions” refer to the phenomena that emerge ideolog-
ically when clashing visions amongst actors lead to imperfect 
legal settlements, or institutionally, when legal implementa-
tion is divided out between different institutions.174 The de-
                                                                                                             
 170. Following the violence that accompanied East Timor’s independence 
from Indonesia in 1999, the U.N. transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) set up a hybrid international–East Timorese Tribunal (composed 
of international and East Timorese judges) to try the serious criminal offens-
es that took place in 1999. The Tribunal operated from 2000 to 2006. For an 
excellent summary of the Tribunal’s work, see generally CAITLIN REIGER & 
MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CT. FOR TRANSNAT’L JUST., THE SERIOUS CRIMES 
PROCESS IN TIMOR-LESTE: IN RETROSPECT (2006), 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Criminal-Process-
2006-English.pdf. 
 171. See Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Ex-
clusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, United Nations Transi-
tional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (Jun. 
6, 2000), § 5. 
 172. See Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al., Case No. 09/2000, Trial Panel 
Judgment, ¶ 684 (U.N. East Timorese Transitional Admin. Special Panel for 
Serious Crimes Dec. 11, 2001). 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 139, 140. 
 174. See supra Part VI. 
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bates referenced earlier that emerged during the drafting of 
the Rome Statute over the inclusion of an armed conflict re-
quirement for crimes against humanity, and the specific acts 
that could be qualified as crimes against humanity, point to the 
Rome Statute as representing not the final conclusive interna-
tional judgment on the definition of crimes against humanity 
as an international offense, but rather instead as a partial and 
unstable temporary solution that seeks to incorporate funda-
mentally incompatible viewpoints. Indeed, not only does debate 
still exist on the armed conflict nexus for a crime against hu-
manity, even in the wake of the Rome Statute,175 but the inclu-
sion of additional acts into what had previously been a stable 
list of offenses (duplicated in both the ICTY and ICTR Stat-
utes) has generated much controversy.176 These debates 
emerged out of ideological clashed between various national 
delegations to the Rome Conference, who had their own idio-
syncratic reasons (often rooted in very specific historical or so-
cial circumstances) for advocating the positions that they 
did.177 As a brief concluding aside, compare this state of events 
to the parallel doctrinal development of genocide as an interna-
tional criminal offense, which was subject to both a widely rati-
fied international convention (the “Genocide Convention”)178 
and expansive jurisprudential development in the Internation-
al Court of Justice (the “1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion”).179 Unlike 
the situation with crimes against humanity, the definition and 
elaboration of genocide as a specific category of international 
criminal offense that emerged in the wake of the Genocide 
                                                                                                             
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 170, 171. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 159–66. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 160–66. 
 178. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide art. II, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. This Convention defines genocide as the tar-
geting of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the following acts: 
murder, causing serious bodily/mental harm, deliberately inflicting condi-
tions designed to destroy the targeted group, preventing births within the 
targeted group, and transferring children from the targeted group to another 
group. Id. art. II. For such acts to constitute genocide, they must be commit-
ted with the intent to destroy the targeted group “in whole or in part.” Id. 
 179. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (May 28). 
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Convention and 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion (on the Conven-
tion) has remained remarkably stable.180 
The status of crimes against humanity today as an interna-
tional offense is well established and not in doubt—the years 
following the Second World War, especially the last two dec-
ades following the establishments of the ICTY and ICTR, saw 
the status of crimes against humanity as a specific type of in-
ternational crime solidify. What the preceding section has 
shown, however, is that the specific doctrinal development of 
crimes against humanity is still today very much in flux and 
subject to repeated recursive cycles of norm-making. Perhaps 
once the ICC begins trying cases in earnest and building a body 
of case law, these cycles will dissipate as norm-making episodes 
settle and come to an end (indicating acceptance as to applica-
tion of meaning). Time will tell, although the imperfect legal 
settlement that is the Rome Statute may not bode well for such 
a clear outcome in the future. This analysis departs radically 
from more typical international legal scholarship charting the 
development of crimes against humanity. Instead of centering 
the investigation on an imprecise methodology charting the 
practice of states in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, and then coupling with a study of “why” states ex-
actly behaved in this manner, the investigation presented 
above takes a more empirical approach focusing on the reality 
of the international system as it operates. Instead of ignoring 
transnational actors or relegating them to the background, the 
analysis presented above recognizes them as the key actors 
(within the international system) that they have become. 
                                                                                                             
 180. Indeed, the main development in the doctrine in the years following 
the Genocide Convention and 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion has not been on its 
definition and elaboration as a specific category of international offense ap-
plying to individual responsibility, but rather on whether genocide operates 
as a category of international civil offense that can hold entire states (rather 
than individuals) liable. See Case Concerning the Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz. 
v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 595, 616 (Jul. 
11) (Where the ICJ held that claims for state responsibility for genocide were 
admissible under the Genocide Convention.); Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz. v. 
Serb. and Montenegro), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 43, 237-40 (Feb. 26) (Where the ICJ 
held that Serbia-Montenegro, as a state, was not responsible for genocide 
committed in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict that erupt-
ed there in the 1990s.). 
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An analysis of international norm formation anchored in a 
framework of legal recursivity, as the example with crimes 
against humanity presented above demonstrates, opens up the 
study to a whole host of empirical methods. With the example 
presented above, one sees a comparative case study181 looking 
at comparing the many iterations of crimes against humanity 
as an international offense, married with an approach that 
charts how the lack of a widely ratified international treaty 
and/or accompanying International Court of Justice jurispru-
dence created an environment where the doctrinal development 
of the offense lacked an institutionalizing component182 that 
could centrally filter and control the developing elements of the 
offense.183 What one had with crimes against humanity’s devel-
opment was a situation where the struggle between different 
actors, both state and transnational, set the stage for “indeter-
minacy” and “contradictions” to emerge and drive recursive cy-
cles of norm-making across time and space. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has surveyed the ways in which current interpre-
tations of customary international law are flawed and the deep 
uncertainty and confusion over the role of state practice and 
opinio juris within the customary element. It has also illustrat-
ed how new theories of customary international law have 
proved inadequate in clarifying the current state of the field, 
and how the heavily state-centric bias of customary interna-
tional law, as currently conceptualized, fails to take into ac-
count the very real affects norm-generating transnational ac-
tors have on the international system. This article has also dis-
cussed “conceptual stretching,” an idea coined by the social sci-
entist Giovanni Sartori to describe the distortions that result 
when established concepts are introduced to new cases without 
the required accompanying adaption, and has suggested that 
the current confusion rampant in customary international law 
can be traced to how its current conceptualization, relying as it 
                                                                                                             
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 115. 
 182. By taking a view that conceptualizes institutions as both shaping be-
havior and mediating outcomes, the analysis of the doctrinal development of 
crimes against humanity presented very much keeps in line with classically 
historical institutionalist approaches from political science. See discussion 
supra note 119. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 177–80. 
2016] Reconceptualizing Custom 49 
does on the dual attributes of state practice and opinio juris, is 
“conceptually stretched.” Utilizing Sartori’s “ladder of abstrac-
tion,” a new framework for studying customary international 
norms has been suggested, one that looks to general theories of 
norm formation. In pursuing this line of inquiry, the idea of 
“legal recursivity” proposed by legal sociologists Terence Halli-
day and Bruce Carruthers has been suggested as a more apt 
description of how, in a new international system dominated by 
norm-generating transnational actors, international norms de-
velop and operate. “Legal recursivity” examines how norms can 
be exchanged and transferred between the transnational gov-
ernmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental institu-
tions within the international community as a whole, and do-
mestic states. In short, the framework proposed is the follow-
ing: 
Figure 6: A Recursive Framework of Norm Formation 
More Abstract (low intension, high extension) 
(Concept: General Norm Formation) 
 Attributes:  - The Physical Element (driven by 
cycles 
    of “legal recursivity”) 
 
 
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension) 
(Concept: Customary International Norm Formation) 
 Attributes:  - The Physical Element (state prac-
tice) 
- The Mental Element (opinio juris) 
    
“Legal recursivity,” as a description of how international 
norms develop and operate (and indeed interact with national 
norms) points a way forward for international scholarship to-
wards a more rigorous, scientific, and thus empirical approach, 
as evidenced in the case study presented documenting the de-
velopment of crimes against humanity as an international of-
fense. The international system is on pace to become ever more 
complex as transnational actors both continue to expand their 
areas of jurisdiction and persist in their efforts to influence 
state behavior. Under such circumstances, research into the 
development and operation of individual international norms 
becomes all the more vital. Individual issue areas aside, system 
level questions also still abound as to how and why norms 
50 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2 
change character (e.g. from “hard” law to “soft”), why norm-
making shifts between different actors in the international sys-
tem, what factors precede a norm-making episode (and whether 
they are important), and what the implications (if any) of dif-
ferent timing sequences in norm-making episodes are.184 Inter-
national legal scholarship could have much to contribute in the 
exploration of these phenomena were it to adopt a more empiri-
cally based approach. 
                                                                                                             
 184. Halliday, supra note 6, at 271, 276. 
